

Holders Steamed Over Lehman CDOs

Investors in 15 CDOs that **Lehman Brothers** issued in 2006 and 2007 are accusing the bank of misdirecting the deals' reserve funds.

The claim is that rather than parking the capital at its intended destination — ultra-safe cash equivalents — Lehman instead used the money to buy mortgage-backed bonds and other less-liquid instruments that fell outside its profile. The result has been heavy paper losses, and noteholders are thinking about suing the bankrupt institution.

At issue are almost \$6.9 billion of CDOs that Lehman issued partly or completely as credit-default swaps: Airlie CDO 1; Aviv LCDO 2006-1, 2006-2 and 2006-3; Exum Ridge CBO 2006-1, 2006-2, 2006-3, 2006-4, 2006-5, 2007-1 and 2007-2; and Pebble Creek LCDO 2007-2, 2006-1, 2007-1 and 2007-3. The deals are backed by corporate debt instruments or swaps tied to those products.

Under terms of the transactions, Lehman was also supposed to create reserve funds by directing investor capital into U.S. Treasuries or other high-quality, short-term paper. The idea was to keep that money safe, while generating a small yield that could be used to pay interest to noteholders.

But instead, the bank allegedly set up the reserve funds to funnel cash into its Lehman Brothers ABS Enhanced Libor Fund, which in turn invested in a variety of structured products — about half mortgage bonds. While Lehman's goal was probably to generate added yield at a time when those instruments' perform-

ance appeared bulletproof, the move backfired when the debt market tanked last year.

Indeed, sources familiar with the transactions say that liquidating the reserve funds would lead to substantial losses. **Gene Phillips**, a director at CDO-valuation shop **PF2 Securities Evaluations**, noted that the reserve funds were reported to have lost an estimated 20% of their value.

In the worst case, for fully funded deals, that could be enough to wipe out the double-A-rated tranches of the issues even if the rest of the collateral performed perfectly. It is unclear whether the losses would be due to mark-to-market adjustments or realized losses among the underlying bonds.

It could be a while before there are any answers. While the transactions each experienced events of default after Lehman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Sept. 15, the bank isn't likely to liquidate them. That's because the institution holds the most-senior pieces of most of the issues, and therefore has final say over whether or not to unwind them. It has already said it wouldn't liquidate the reserve funds.

Still, bondholders are feeling the consequences of Lehman's gamble. The lowest tranches of the deals have already stopped receiving payments, due to diminished cashflows from the GICs. Recoveries may be difficult as well, given Lehman's bankrupt status and expectations that other parties will seek claims against the company — some involving other CDOs and swaps. ♦

